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NOTES
prosecutor and judge in one person at the deportation hearing. Unfor-
tunately, the Court has receitly upheld this union of functions." This
practice should be abolished, and the hearing provisions of APA should
be held applicable to deportation. If this is accomplished, and the courts
continue the trend toward protecting the alien in the area of the Attorney
General's discretion to suspend deportation, then a fair balance between
the public's interest in removal of undesirable people, and the alien's
interest in personal security will have been attained.
A CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS IN
AUTOMOBILE DEALER FRANCHISES
In the last three years, there has been a significant decline of auto-
mobile dealers' profits as a percent of sales.' Many dealers have gone
into bankruptcy; many others have voluntarily quit.2 The dealers allege
that unless they are helped, the result will be a loss to the public of retail
82. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
1. Year Profits as a percent of sales
1949 5.8%
1950 6.3%
1951 4.9%
1952 3.6%
1953 2.2%
*1954 0.6%
*1955 2.6%
HEWITT, AUTMOBILE DEALERS FRANCHISES (unpublished thesis in Indiana Univer-
sity Library 1955) p. 228 citing figures compiled by the National Automobile Dealers
Association, hereinafter referred to as NADA.
* The figure for 1955 is based on the period from January 1 through September 30.
The figures for 1954 and 1955 are reported in The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1955,
p. 22, col. 2.
In appraising the significance of these figures, it must be remembered that the
profit on the dealership is computed after deduction of a salary to the dealer for manag-
ing the business. This is illustrated by the testimony of Harlow H. Curtice, president
of General Motors, before Senator O'Mahoney's Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee.
"(D)uring the post war period, G.M. dealers have had profits of over $5,000,000,000
after deducting over $1,000,000,000 of owners' salaries and bonuses." N.Y. Times, Dec.
3, 1955, § 1, p. 18, col. 4.
It is also important to note that this measure of profits does not take into account
increased profits resulting from larger volume and higher prices.
Mr. Hewitt's thesis has been of great value in the preparation of this Note. He has
compiled many important statistics and analyzed leading cases involving automobile
dealers.
2. There were 43,079 dealers in 1950; 45,248 in 1953; 43,340 in 1955. Automotive
Industries, March 15, 1955, p. 104.
From Oct. 1, 1952 through March 31, 1953, NADA reported over 3,200 dealers went
out of business. HEWIrr, op. cit. supra at 228.
Dun and Bradstreet figures show that there were 219 dealers' bankruptcies in 1953,
the highest number since 1938. Id. at 229.
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outlets and service facilities which are essential in the automotive econ-
omy.3 Because negotiation with the manufacturers has done little to
solve or alleviate their problems,4 and the courts will not correct the in-
equities,5 dealers are striving for legislation both on the federal and state
level.' Their principal organization, the National Automobile Dealers
Association' has succeeded in having introduced in Congress bills which
would exempt certain agreements from the anti-trust laws.8 In the state
legislatures, the NADA is working for statutes which will force changes
in the dealer-producer relationship.'
The dealers' difficulties stem from three factors: (1) competition
among manufacturers; (2) competitive practices of dealers; and (3) the
relationship between the manufacturer and the dealer. If legislation in
the interest of the dealer is also to be in the public interest, it is neces-
sary to analyze the problem in terms of its causes. A further problem
lies in determining at which level, state or federal, appropriate measures
can be taken.
3. "Whereas, this condition if long continued, will result in a sharp decline in the
number of distributors, jobbers, and retail dealers and a corresponding loss of avail-
ability of replacement part inventories, service facilities, shop equipment and personnel
for the proper maintenance and repair of durable goods in the hands of the public .. "
Preamble, SENATE ENROLLED CONCURRENT RESOLUTION No. 10 Indiana Acts, ch. 235,
1955. This resolution established a committee to study the selling agreements of manu-
facturers with their retail sellers.
4. Frederick J. Bell, executive vice-president of the NADA, testifying before the
Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee said that dealers have tried repeatedly to
get manufacturers to agree on a franchise contract that would give the dealers more
independence and more protection against short notice cancellation by the factories. But,
the dealers have had little or no success "which indicates that the manufacturers have
no intention of taking voluntary action that would remove the dealers from the condi-
tion of vassalage." The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 1955, p. 24, col. 2.
5. See text at note 36 infra.
6. This appeal for legislative help is not unprecedented. The dealers were actively
seeking assistance twenty years ago and succeeded in having several states pass statutes
in their interest. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8072-74 (1942) (enacted 1934) ; IowA CODE
ANN. § 322.3 (1946) (enacted 1937) ; WIsc. STAT. § 218.01 (1953) (enacted 1937);
NED. REV. STAT. § 60-611 (Reissue 1952) (enacted 1937). In the 1940's other states en-
acted similar statutes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.60-70 (1953); VA. CODE § 46-534
(1950). Since World War II, other states have enacted legislation. There are today
twenty states which regulate the dealer manufacturer relationship.
Dealers also succeeded in having the FTC make a major investigation of the auto-
motive industry, the report of which was critical of the domination of the dealer by the
producer. See FTC, Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry, H.R. Doc. No. 468, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. Three bills were introduced and assigned to the House Subcommittee on Com-
merce and Finance. H.R. 2688, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ("bootlegging"); H.R.
6544, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ("cross-selling"); H.R. 528, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955) ("phantom freight"). See note 19 infra.
9. See note 3 supra.
NOTES
The Effect on the Dealer of Competition Among the Producers
There is an earnest competition among the five10 automobile pro-
ducers to maintain and increase their share of the total demand for new
cars. The competitive battle is chiefly waged by style changes rather than
by price reductions. Style changes are supported by extensive advertising
to influence the prospective buyer as to their prestige." Restyling is
expensive; the cost of tools and dies must be recovered before the style
becomes obsolete regardless of how long the physical assets remain serv-
iceable. High volume production is a competitive necessity if costs are
to be recovered and a profit made before competition forces a style
change.'2 An integral aspect of the manufacturer's success is a sales
force capable of moving cars to the public in great volume. Nationwide
coverage by a strong force of dealers is traditionally regarded as most
important.3 The producer wants dealers to contact every potential buyer;
otherwise the sale may go to a competitor.
High volume production is the greatest source of conflict between
manufacturer and dealer. The dealer's profit per unit goes progressively
down as he must attract reluctant buyers by more advertising, by a larger
sales force, by premiums," and by discounts, either directly or indirectly
through larger trade-in allowances. The dealer wants "production geared
realistically to demand,"'" but there is a question of how demand is to be
determined. If the traditional method of distribution is to be retained,
"demand" must lie at some point between the number of buyers who will
seek out a dealer and offer full list price and the number who will buy
only when the selling price is such as to jeopardize an enfranchised dealer's
investment. The dealers complain that to retain their franchises they are
pressured to order more cars than they can sell at a profit.'" They charge
that termination of franchises for continued refusal to expand volume is
10. General Motors, Ford Motor Co., Chrysler, Studebaker-Packard, and Ameri-
can Motors. The Willys Motor Co. indefinitely suspended automobile production in the
early part of 1955.
11. There is a "follow-the-leader" aspect to American consumer demand. Many
buyers want the same car as "everybody else is driving." As a result, the producers say
the sight of a car on the road is more effective advertising than a picture of it on a
billboard. The force of this consumer psychology is highlighted by the race between
Chevrolet and Ford for sales leadership.
12. For the adverse effect on one major producer of waiting too long to change
styles, see Chrysler Takes the Bumps, Fortune, April 1954, p. 127.
13. For a good discussion of the development of the automotive industry's distribu-
tion system, see SELTZER, A FIxANcIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUS-
aRY (1928).
14. This is the practice of offering an attractive piece of merchandise free with
the purchase of a car.
15. HEwiTT, op. cit. supra at 242.
16. See The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 1955, p. 24, col. 3.
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"wrongful.' 7 Courts do not decide the issue because they hold that the
manufacturer's right to terminate is "absolute."'" If the legislators choose
to modify the right, it must be remembered that the manufacturer has a
legitimate interest in replacing dealers with others who he may expect to
be more volume conscious.
The Effect on the Dealer of Competition by Other Dealers
"Bootlegging" and "cross-selling" are the two practices about which
dealers most complain. The former is the practice of a franchised dealer
selling his cars at wholesale to a used car dealer. The used car dealer with
the advantage of low overhead then competes with the franchised dealer
in another territory. 9 "Cross-selling" is the practice of a franchised
dealer selling a car to a buyer located in the territory of another franchised
dealer.'" The dealer can sell to this buyer for less because he does not
expect to have to perform on all preparatory and warranty expenses.2
Prior to 1949 most franchise agreements provided that a dealer
could sell only to ultimate consumers; a dealer who sold outside his terri-
tory promised to pay a fee to reimburse the offended dealer. Attorney
General McGrath expressed an opinion informally that these provisions
17. Ibid.
18. Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motors Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. Dealers complain that an important cause of bootlegging is the "phantom
freight" charged by the producers. Phantom freight is the billing of a freight charge
to the dealer based on the distance of the dealer from the main assembly point (usually
Detroit), even if the car is actually delivered from a smaller assembly factory nearer to
the dealer. The franchised dealer must pay the delivered price charged by the manufac-
turer, but the used car dealer buying from a "bootlegger" close to Detroit can have the
car on his lot at a lower price and thus have a competitive advantage. See text at note
8 supra.
The problem of freight charges is, however, not that simple. If the dealer were
billed actual freight charges, then the producer would have to charge a higher price for
cars delivered from the smaller assembly plants because they are higher cost of opera-
tions. They must absorb the increased freight charges of all parts and sub-assemblies
shipped to them; their overhead cost per unit is higher because of their lower volume.
In charging a flat price plus freight for the finished car, the producer seeks to avoid
billing every car at a different price depending on where it was finally assembled and
to preserve flexibility in deliveries on dealers' orders.
The dealer would have a legitimate grievance if the manufacturers' freight charge
were more than a competitive firm would charge for equivalent service. There are ex-
isting laws to prevent this. To be sure, the used car dealer in an outlying point can buy
from a "bootlegger" near Detroit and have the car driven to his lot cheaper than it can
be shipped by rail or truck, but the consumer purchasing from him buys an inferior car
because of the distance it has been driven or towed. If many consumers do not discrimi-
nate against "slightly used" cars, then as a matter of policy the manufacturers could
allow the dealer to choose on his orders between the present method and taking delivery
at Detroit. This would allow the dealer maximum flexibility to meet competition in his
area.
20. This is also referred to as a violation of the dealer's "territorial security."
21. It is also a way of moving a car at a discount with small chance of knowledge
of the price reaching regular buyers in the territory.
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constituted a restraint on trade in new cars.22 As a result, the manufac-
turers eliminated the provisions in fear of criminal prosecution."
The elimination of "bootlegging" and "cross-selling" would remove
a major cause of dealer selling below list prices. The contention for
elimination is essentially a retail price maintenance argument: List prices
permit a retailer to make a reasonable profit so that he can continue in
business and afford to give the service necessary for customer satisfac-
tion. Under present practices, however, the consumer has a choice. He
may bargain for a lower price on an open lot by foregoing the manu-
facturer's warranty and "authorized" pre-sale service or bargain for
warranty and service from an authorized dealer.
Dealers complain of a practice by which some dealers "pad" list
prices for purposes of conducting a "blitz sale."24 This involves a repre-
sentation that the selling price of a new car is a figure several hundred
dollars above actual list price; the seller then offers trade-in values,
premiums, or cash discounts much above normal to induce the buyer to
believe that he is "getting a good deal." These sales are accompanied by
an advertising campaign that is disruptive to the normal business of other
dealers in and around the territory.
Dealers are forced into these practices primarily to satisfy the pro-
ducers' demand for large volume. 5 If a dealer ordered only the number
of cars he believed he could readily dispose of in his territory, there
would be little complaint about practices of other dealers. It is necessary
to examine the peculiar relationship between manufacturer and dealer
to discover why the dealer orders unwanted cars.
The Effect on the Dealer of His Relationship With, the Producer
Contrary to common belief, the relationship between producer and
dealer is not controlled by the terms of their franchise agreement. The
manufacturer exercises his control by virtue of the wide disparity in eco-
nomic positions. The written contract is merely a summary of the one-
sided relationship which the dealer can expect once he has invested his
22. See The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 1955, p. 22, col. 1.
23. Ibid.
24. In speaking before the annual meeting of the American Finance Conference at
Chicago in November 1955, Frank H. Yarnall, president of the NADA, announced that
NADA and the Better Business Bureaus were teaming up to halt "misleading and un-
true advertising [which] has had more to do with the chaotic condition in our industry
than any other single thing." The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 4, col. 4.
25. See the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 1955, p. 22, col. 2. But, in the same re-
port, Harlow H. Curtice gives the reason for "bootlegging" as being "the selfish desire
of some dealers for quick, nominal profits at the expense of the public and other dealers."
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time and money." The automobile dealership is not flexible like the
business of many other retailers who can push the product of one or
another of various manufacturers." Everything the automobile dealer
does must be satisfactory to one manufacturer. The size of his invest-
ment, location and layout of show room, the stock of parts maintained,
and efforts to sell are all subjects of reports and inspection. 2 In return
the dealer receives the opportunity to make money as an authorized dealer.
The manufacturer must enter the relationship in good faith,29 but he re-
serves the right to terminate on short notice"0 without regard to the
dealer's opinion of -whether it is fair.3' If the franchise agreement does
not warn the dealer that his economic destiny is in the hands of the manu-
facturer, a long line of judicial opinions should.3"
Good profits and modest fortunes have been made by successful
dealers. They want to retain their franchises because they are usually
profitable and investment in facilities and experience is not easily con-
verted. Because there are only five producers, a dealer has limited free-
dom in changing from one manufacturer to another. Fear of losing his
franchise forces the dealer to accede to the demands of the producer.3
The dealer knows that failure to comply with the manufacturer's request
may result in harassment or, ultimately, termination by notice or refusal
to renew a contract which has expired by its terms."4
Terminated dealers have sued manufacturers for loss of prospective
profits and for loss in the value of the investment. In recent times dealers
26. "But, generally speaking, the situation arises from the strong bargaining posi-
tion which economic factors give the great automobile companies; the dealers are not
misled or imposed upon, but accepted as nonetheless advantageous an agreement in form
bilateral, in fact one-sided." Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d
675, 677 (2d Cir. 1940) (dictum).
27. Retailers of television, radios, refrigerators, and other household durables usu-
ally sell several different products and competing lines of any one product. Like auto
dealers retailers of farm machinery and petroleum products are dependent on one manu-
facturer.
28. See,e.g., Direct Dealer Selling Agreement (1953), Chevrolet Motor Division,
General Motors Corporation, §§ 11-22.
29. Busam Motor Sales v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1953).
30. Ninety days notice is common.
31. "Unfair? Those who desire to philosophize on the subject may do so. But we
are confronted with the problem of construing the agreement, not in criticizing its
terms." Myers Motors v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corporation, 178 F.2d 291, 301 (8th Cir.
1949) (dictum).
32. See notes 35, 36 infra.
33. See note 48 infra.
34. "In 1947, one of the officials of General Motors stated that state laws '(L) imit-
ing the freedom of action by the factories in replacement of dealers was the reason
General Motors switched to the one year franchise agreement.'" HEwIr, op. Cit. supra
at 248. But see note 48 infra. Most companies, however, have continued to use con-
tracts of indefinite duration.
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have been singularly unsuccessful. Suits have been based on tort or con-
tract theories, but, under either, the losses have been held da'minm absque
injuria. Until the middle of the 1930's courts usually declared the fran-
chise agreements illusory and, thus, unenforceable by either party."3 The
more recent cases hold that there is a contract but that the right of termi-
nation as provided in the agreement is absolute ;" therefore, allegations
that the termination was in "bad faith" or "without cause" are irrele-
vant. 7 Dealers have also sued for treble damages under the federal anti-
trust laws"8 alleging that termination was made pursuant to an illegal
restraint of trade." This remedy is theoretically attractive but practically
worthless; necessary litigation is too long and expensive for the average
dealer.4" The burden of proof is heavy, almost impossible.4 Few cases
ever reach a jury, and most end in a summary judgment 2 for the manu-
facturer. The conclusion follows that terminated dealers do not have a
judicial remedy.
The Legislative Problem
It would not be in the public interest to enact legislation on the
manufacturer-dealer relationship if its only purpose were to preserve the
present method of distributing cars.4" There is a natural sympathy, how-
35. Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4 thCir. 1933) ; see also
case collected in Notes, 34 ILL. L. REv. 956 n. 14 958 (1940), 35 ILL. L. REV. n. 2 601
(1941).
36. Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940); Bushwick-Decatur
Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Biever Motor Car Co. v. Chrys-
ler Corporation, 199 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1952).
37. Cf. Jones v. Lathrop-Meyer Co., 99 Ind. App. 127, 190 N.E. 883 (1934).
38. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
39. For a good discussion of the problem, see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 417 (1952).
40. "Pre-trial preparation demands research by highly skilled attorneys; the trial
is long, susceptible to delay and procrastination; appeals and new trials are endless.
Thus corporate offenders, possessed of vast resources, are often able to exhaut their op-
ponents." Id. at 419.
41. First, the plaintiff must prove the defendant did in fact violate the anti-trust
laws and that the public was thereby harmed. Allegations of harm to the plaintiff in-
dividually, without allegations of public harm are insufficient to state a cause of action.
Federsen Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950). Second, the plaintiff
must prove that there was a causal connection between the illegal acts and the termina-
tion. This requires proof that termination was not for any other reason because the
manufacturer has an absolute right to terminate except in pursuit of an illegal objective.
This is a next-to-impossible burden. Third, the plaintiff must prove damages with a
high degree of certainty because courts are impressed with the severity of threefold
damages. Note 61 YALE L.J. 417, 419 (1952).
42. This applies to suits brought in tort or contract as well as under the anti-trust
laws. See HEwiTT, op. cit. supra at 8.
43. As long as demand continues, the public need for retail outlets and service fa-
cilities will be supplied by a parallel development of independent repair garages and
dealers operating in a manner analogous to supermarkets; or the manufacturers may en-
ter the retail field. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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ever, for this, apparently independent, small businessman who is, in fact,
economically tied to a dominant corporation and powerless to protect his
interests when they become divergent from the interests of the corpora-
tion. He is important in the economy; his efforts and investment" dis-
tribute to the public its most important manufactured product. The exis-
tence of a power disparity which permits the weaker party to be subject
to arbitrary or illegal actions is distasteful even if exercise of the power
is uncommon. These factors justify study to determine whether legisla-
tion assisting dealers will further the public interest.
Attempts to balance power within our economy by legislative man-
date have been of questionable success." The immediate problem is fur-
ther complicated by overlapping federal and state jurisdiction. The
lessening of the disparity between producers and dealers may be accom-
plished by increasing the power of dealers so that they can more effec-
tively bargain with the producers or by limiting the producer's power to
act adversely to the dealer. There has been natural development along
both these lines." NADA has not developed sufficient power to demand
bargaining over franchise terms but has influenced public opinion and
secured governmental inquiry." The manufacturer's freedom of action
has been limited by the force of public opinion, as exemplified by General
Motors' extension of dealer franchises."
44. NADA reports that the average investment for automobile dealers is over
$100,000 and the aggregate is over $4,000,000,000. HEwrrr, op. cit. szupra at 227.
45. E.g., National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (1933).
46. For a discussion of the theory of the development of power in the weaker
party, See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, THE CONCEPT OF THE COUNTERVAILING
POWER 115-157 (1952).
For a discussion of the development by corporations of a sense of responsibility to
the public interest, See BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
47. The Federal Trade Commission's investigation of the motor vehicle industry
in 1939 was instigated by the NADA. Note, 34 ILL. L. REV. 956, n. 5 957 (1940). Much
attention has been given to the airing of dealers' complaints before the Senate Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee which is studying the need for changes in the anti-trust
laws. Congressional Record, S. REs. 61, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 CONG. REc. 2707
(daily ed. March 18, 1955). Significantly, a Senate Commerce Subcommittee is also
studying dealers' problems arising from automobile "bootlegging." Congressional Record,
S. RES. 13, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REC. 985 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1955).
48. Harlow H. Curtice made a surprise announcement before Senator O'Mahoney's
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee to the effect that General Motors had extended
the terms of all G.M. dealers from one year to five years 'because the public had been
misinformed about General Motors' policies. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 1955,
p. 24, col. 1.
General Motors retains, however, the right to terminate on ninety days' notice if the
dealer does not operate his business to General Motors' satisfaction. See Direct Dealer
Selling Agreement (1953), Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, § 25.
Perhaps more significant, as an indication of the feeling of the producers' responsi-
bility, are the agreements to buy back certain parts, tools, and unsold cars even if the
termination is by the dealer. General Motors and Ford also assume part of the
dealer's obligation on an unexpired leasehold. Id. at §§ 27-28.
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A few dealers have suggested that Congress enact a broad exemption
from the anti-trust laws for dealer organizations so that they may bargain
collectively over franchise terms. 9 Others advocate governmental control
with production limitations."0  NADA realistically 1 refuses to endorse
such policies.12 It has not been shown that the public interest is so iden-
tified with the present method of distribution that the system should be
perpetuated by altering the anti-trust laws; nor is there evidence that
government can determine demand better than the traditional combina-
tion of public choice and the profit motive.
There has never been federal legislation directly concerned with the
producer-dealer relationship."3 Currently, NADA is urging Congress to
modify the anti-trust laws to allow prohibition of "bootlegging" and
"cross-selling."" ' The Justice Department opposes passage of the bills55
because they would permit each dealer to have a monopoly within his
territory."0 This legislation is not crucial to the manufacturer-dealer
relationship. Enforcement of the prohibition would be in the hands of the
producer. The modifications, if enforced, would assist the dealer in
maintaining retail prices; but it is doubtful that the public interest would
be served by any further departure from the policy embodied in the anti-
49. These were some of the suggestions received by Senator Monroney's Com-
merce Subcommittee in response to a questionnaire sent to 42,000 dealers. The Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 6.
50. Ibid.
51. Numerically, dealers are not an important political force. See note 2 supra.
52. "If we seek the enactment of laws that would curb honest competition we are
not merely short-sighted but greedy and unrealistic as well. Should we ever approach
the Congress with pleas for the peacetime establishment of production controls we
would be very foolish men, indeed, and our efforts would be foreordained to fail." Mes-
sage to dealers by Frederick J. Bell, executive vice-president of NADA. NADA (of-
ficial publication of the National Automobile Dealers Association), Jan. 1955, p. 23.
53. Automobile distribution has been regulated incidentally to general economic
legislation in periods of emergency, such as the N.I.R.A., 48 STAT. 195 (1933) aid pro-
duction and credit regulation in World War II and the Korean War, e.g., 55 STAT. 236
(1941).
In 1940, following the FTC's Report, Congressman Wright Patman agreed to intro-
duce a bill prepared by a committee of the NADA which would have provided compre-
hensive regulation of the manufacturer-dealer relationship. In a referendum conducted
among the members of NADA, however, the proposals were overwhelmingly dis-
approved. The bill was not introduced. See 63 HARv. L. Rxv. 1010, 1022 (1950).
54. See note 8 supra.
55. Also opposed are the Federal Trade Commission, the Commerce Department,
and the Budget Bureau. These agencies have expressed concern that the precedents
would lead to similar appeals by other groups. The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1955,
p. 18, col. 1.
56. If the fee imposed on a dealer for violating "territorial security" served only to
cover the costs of the offended dealer for servicing necessary to maintain good will, it
would not be a monopoly. The difficulty lies in setting a fee which does not deter
dealers from selling to any purchaser.
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trust laws of encouraging competition.5"
Dealer groups have been successful in securing legislation in several
states ;"8 but the statutes have been largely unrealistic. 9 The common
statutory scheme is to provide that all producers and dealers be licensed
to do business. The manufacturer may lose his license if he coerces the
dealer to take delivery of any unordered goods,6" or to enter into any
agreement unfair to the dealer,6 or cancels the franchise "without due
regard to the equities of the dealer and without just provocation."'6 2 The
statutes differ as to whether the loss of license applies to the entire stateG3
or only to the territory of the dealer affected. Further, they differ as
to whether the loss of license is for ninety days," one year,66 or forever."6
The severity of some states' penalty makes enforcement impractical; the
public would not accept the exclusion of one of the five producers from
the state. In any event, the manufacturer can avoid these statutes by the
simple expedient of making the franchise expire by its own terms after
a short period" or by following a policy of non-cooperation which may
cause the dealer to withdraw. The terms used in the statutes, "due regard
to the equities," "unfair to the dealer," and "just provocation" are phrases
without a legal definition. Because these standards are concerned with
the effect upon the dealer rather than the manufacturer's pursuit of a
legitimate interest, they do not appear to be synonomous with the term
"good faith." If enforceable, these statutes are of questionable value to
the dealer because a right of action is not usually provided.
The effectiveness of this statutory scheme is largely dependent on
whether the manufacturers' policy is influenced by fear that adverse
publicity will result from charges of violation. Wisconsin and Colorado
have attempted to strengthen their statutes by providing that non-renewal
57. A Justice Department spokesman, testifying before the House Commerce Sub-
committee, said: "It has never been the purpose of the anti-trust law to preserve the
status quo, or to guarantee protection against impairment of capital which might result
from competition in the form of new products or new methods of sale." The Wall
Street Journal, July 7, 1955, p. 18, col. 1.
58. See note 6 supra.
59. There are no reported cases of dealers obtaining judicial relief by virtue of
the statute.
60. E.g., WISC. STAT. § 218.01(3) (a) 15 (1953).
61. E.g., WIsc. STAT. § 218.01(3) (a) 16 (1953).
62. E.g., Wisc. STAT. § 218.01(3) (a) 17 (1953).
63. MIss. CODE ANN. § 8071.3 (Supp. 1954).
64. WIsc. STAT. § 218.01(8)(d) (1953).
65. IOWA CODE ANN. § 322.6(7) (1946).
66. Wisc. STAT. § 218.01(8) (d) (1953).
67. Many statutes do not specify the length of time for license revocation, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 8071.3 (Supp. 1954), supplementing Miss. CODE Axx. § 8072 (1942).
68. See note 34 supra.
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without just provocation or cause constitutes an unfair cancellation and an
evasion of the law.69 In addition the Colorado statute allows an injunc-
tion in such a case to force the manufacturer to continue the relationship.7"
If constitutional, these provisions are severe; they change a privilege
granted by the manufacturer into a vested right enforceable against him.
Traditionally, the law has been reluctant to grant specific performance
of the terms of a business relationship. 7 The accepted policy has been
to let a party terminate the relationship by paying damages for any injury
caused by the termination.
Ioderation is required in adjusting economic relationships because
it is impossible to foresee all the results which will follow in a complex
economy. This is particularly important at the state level because of con-
stitutional limitations on regulations of commerce,72 impairment of the
obligations of contract,7 3 and restrictions on the liberty of persons. 4
Whether legislation is enacted on the federal or state level, a stan-
dard must be established by which a manufacturer's conduct can be meas-
ured and a sanction imposed to enforce the policy. If the reason for a
statute is to prevent arbitrary action which injures the dealer and, conse-
quently, disrupts the economic community, the best sanction is to give a
right of action to the dealer. This compensates the very person the law
seeks to protect.7 ' Determining a measure of damages is difficult; it is a
question on which there is considerable disagreement among courts. Re-
liance damages 7' are seldom a good criteria because termination often
takes place after a dealer has had an opportunity to recoup his investment.
When loss of profits is the measure, it must be determined whether loss
of potential profits can be taken into account only until the contract would
expire by its own terms, or during the period of notice provided by the
contract, or during a reasonable period of notice.7  Perhaps a more satis-
factory measure is the difference between the selling price of the dealer-
69. WISC. STAT. § 218.01(3) (a) 17 (1953).
70. This provision was added in 1955 as an amendment to the dealers licensing law.
COL. REV. STAT. §§ 13-11 (1953). General Motors filed suit Oct. 28, 1955 in a federal
court asking that the amendment be declared an unreasonable regulation of private busi-
ness transaction. General Motors alleges that without liberty of contract it will be un-
able to maintain an aggressive dealer organization. See the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31,
1955, p. 3, col. 4.
71. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 377 (1932).
72. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
73. U.S. CozCsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
74. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV § 1.
75. HORACK, LEGISLATION 195 (1954).
76. See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
77. The controversy is illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Chev-
rolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, 42 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1930).
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ship and the fair market value as determined by independent appraisers."
There is precedent for this method. 9
The basic problem lies in determining a standard of conduct. Legis-
lation could be enacted requiring that all franchise agreements be con-
trued in terms of good faith.8" This would allow the manufacturer to
terminate if he acted to further a legitimate interest, but it would give
a right to damages if termination resulted from dealer resistance to de-
mands which are arbitrary or made in pursuance of objectives proscribed
by the anti-trust laws."' Such a statute would make termination and other
aspects of the relationship a jury issue. This would be an advantage to
the dealer who, as a small businessman, would attract the sympathy of
the jury; but there would be many reversals on appeal. The principal
difficulty with a good faith statute is that it forces the courts to review
the day-to-day decisions of business. Courts are not trained for this role.
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which a businessman will be ham-
pered by knowledge that every decision may have to be justified in detail
at some later time; it may be too great a price for eliminating possible
arbitrary action.
An alternative approach 2 is to provide that a producer must give
78. The dealership as a going concern is a good measure because its value is com-
posed of all elements adversely affected by termination: the physical assets, the good
will, and the present value of prospective profits. The application is limited, however,
because there are many instances when the "new" dealer does not want the plant of the
"old" dealer or the "old" dealer plans to convert his physical assets to another use.
79. Cf. Gelfert v. National City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221 (1941). The
Court upheld the validity of a New York statute which directed judges to determine the
fair market value of the property when there was a foreclosure sale of mortgaged
premises. A deficiency judgment was limited to the difference between the amount of
the debt and the fair market value. The Court pointed out that traditionally, equity will
set aside a sale if there are "circumstances against its fairness such as chilled bidding."
Id. at 232. There is an analogy to the sale of a dealership because it is an involuntary
conversion for the dealer and the bidding is chilled because the only person who will bid
is one to whom the manufacturer will grant a franchise.
80. See Note, 63 HARVARD L. REV. 1010, 1019 (1950). This is an excellent note on
the subject of dealers' franchises.
'81. As to the proscription on forcing the dealer to use certain finance companies,
see United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 710 (1941). As to forcing the dealer to use parts
and accessories supplied by the manufacturers, see General Motors Corp. 34 F.T.C. 58
(1942).
These problems are still current. Senator O'Mahoney's Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee received testimony to the effect that General Motors continues to use its
dominant position to compel dealers to use G.M.A.C. financing and "genuine" G.M. parts.
See The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 4, col. 3; see also The Wall Street Jour-
nal, Nov. 22, 1955, p. 26, col. 1; Nov. 23, 1955, p. 11, col. 2; Nov. 28, 1955, p. 3, col. 1;
Nov. 29, 1955, p. 4, col. 2; Dec. 5, 1955, p. 3, col. 1.
82. Continued focusing of public attention on the problem may accomplish better
results than legislation. After a five week public study of General Motors, Senator
O'Mahoney indicated that, in his opinion, the auto makers should take further steps to-
word giving the dealers greater independence. He expressed the hope that this could
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dealers a substantial period of notice before termination.83 To prevent
avoidance of the statute, it would be necessary to provide further that
during the entire period of the franchise relationship, including the notice
period, the manufacturer must deal in good faith. Good faith should be
defined and limited to the readiness of the manufacturer to deliver as
many cars in proportion to the number ordered as are provided to dealers
in similar territories both within and without the state.8" This is suffi-
ciently objective so that variation from the standard can be readily proved.
The express terms of the statute should give dealers a right to sue for
breach of good faith.8" If a dealer received notice of termination or if
he elected to terminate,8" he would have the opportunity to make a profit
during the notice period or the equivalent in damages. This scheme87 gives
the dealer a chance to liquidate or convert his investment and make ar-
rangements for a new enterprise. It removes the fear of imminent termi-
nation, yet leaves the producer free to adjust his sales organization as he
sees fit with a minimum of restriction.
VALIDITY OF MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATIONS AND A
CONSIDERATION OF THE NEED FOR THE WALSH-HEALY ACT
The Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act,1 enacted in 1936, gave the
Secretary of Labor power to prescribe minimum wages2 for industries
be achieved voluntarily. See the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 3, col. 1.
83. The minimum period should be six months. Perhaps this is not long enough
because dealers usually make their profits in the first half of the model year; conse-
quently, if notice of cancellation were received at the end of the first six months of the
model year, there would be little opportunity for a profit during the notice period.
84. This would not require the manufacturer to deliver on all orders accepted from
the dealers, but it would require the manufacturers to treat each dealer equitably if total
orders received were in excess of ability to supply.
85. Under this good faith requirement the manufacturer would be liable to the
dealer for reducing shipments of cars as a means of coercing a dealer. The manufac-
turer could still terminate if he believed his policies would be better carried out by an-
other dealer.
86. The right to profits during the notice period would accrue to the dealer who
terminated only if the manufacturer failed to give his orders the same treatment ac-
corded other dealers' orders. He would also be entitled to damages for loss of profits
caused by a previous failure to similarly honor orders.
87. It would be necessary to phrase the statute so that the manufacturer could not
coerce the dealer to bargain away his rights. Similarly, it must be phrased so that the
dealer's right can not be lost by a term of the franchise agreement. Most franchises
provide for interpretation under the laws of Michigan; therefore, a state statute which
instructs the courts on interpretation can be avoided.
1. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1952). The act bears the
names of the two Massachusetts congressmen who sponsored it.
2. Before the passage of the act, the Federal Government was in the untenable
position of urging the betterment of labor conditions, on the one hand, and of hamper-
